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Abstract 
Vikas  Mehrotra,  Randall  Morck,  Jungwook  Shim  and  Yupana  Wiwattanakantang  (2013;  hereafter
MMSW) observe that listed family firms on average outperform non-family firms in Japan between 1962-
2000. They suggest that this finding can be explained by the practice of adult adoptions and, to a lesser
degree, by arranged marriages. Their argument centers on a positive performance differential between
non-blood and blood heirs.
We cannot exactly replicate MMSW's research, because the authors do not share their data. However, we
identify  methodological  concerns  with  the  evidencing  of  this  differential  and  show  how  conceptual
considerations reduce their  argument to that  of  arranged marriages.  Regardless of any differential  we
propose another interpretation for the superior performance of businesses run by non-blood heirs and
identify indicative evidence for this.
[123 words]
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1. Introduction
“Japan represents a special case” is a statement frequently found in the economics literature (Nicholas
Kaldor 1975; Bradford De Long 1988; Kent Calder 1993; Paul Cavelaars 2005; Stefania Lottanti von
Mandach 2014). While Japan may effectively be different in some respects (Eric Girardin and Zakaria
Moussa 2011; Georg Blind 2012), there is a tendency among Japanese and non-Japanese scholars alike to
attribute deviations from some “Western mean” to that country’s cultural uniqueness (Ronald Dore 1987;
Charles  Hill  1995;  Donald  Katzner  2008).  The  authors  of  "Adoptive  Expectations:  Rising  Sons  in
Japanese Family Firms" (Vikas Mehrotra, Randall Morck, Jungwook Shim and Yupana Wiwattanakantang
2013;  hereafter  MMSW) also  refer  to  a  “unique  setting”  of  institutions  (p.  841)  in  interpreting  the
observation that listed family firms on average outperformed non-family firms between 1962 and 2000.
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Specifically, MMSW suggest  that the Japanese practice of adult adoptions,  potentially combined with
arranged marriages, provides the basis for three performance-enhancing mechanisms: 
Mech. 1: Adopted non-blood heirs displace the least talented blood sons. 
Mech. 2: The availability of a non-blood heir “job”, i.e., the perspective of becoming adopted,
motivates professional managers to excel.
Mech. 3: The threat of being replaced by adoptees motivates blood sons. 
We agree that  non-blood successors may be better  performers  if  selected for talent  through arranged
marriages. We are skeptical, however, as to whether the other two mechanisms actually apply. 
We further agree with MMSW that causality is not clear. While non-blood heirs might actually cause good
performance,  the  converse  is  also  possible.  Here,  MMSW suggest  that  aging  patriarchs  “might  pass
healthy firms to beloved sons, who might more earnestly covet control of healthier firms” (2013: 848). We
do not understand how this could represent converse causality, as it would imply that blood heirs should
be  found  to  lead  more  successful  companies  (contrary  to  the  MMSW observation).  Instead,  such  a
converse causality hypothesis would need to explain why more profitable companies more frequently
attract non-blood successors. We will revert to this issue later (section 4).
To clarify this endogeneity problem and to provide evidence for their hypothesis, MMSW opt to
study the performance impact of succession events. In doing so MMSW find that passing on a family
business to a non-blood heir leads to significantly stronger performance improvements than successions to
blood sons. We have, however, various methodological concerns with regard to how MMSW treat the
sample of these succession events. 
For later reference, we briefly summarize the MMSW observations:
Obs.1: Family businesses outperform non-family businesses during 1962-2000.
Obs.2: Family businesses led by non-blood heirs outperform those led by sons during 1962-2000.
Obs.3: Succession to non-blood heirs leads to relatively stronger performance increases.
In essence, MMSW claim that Obs.2 explains Obs.1 through the performance-enhancing mechanisms 
illustrated above. MMSW rely on Obs.3 for clarifying the causality of Obs.2.
We structure our contribution as follows. We start by illustrating our methodological concerns with regard
to the analysis underlying MMSW Obs.3 (section 2). Moving on, we propose an adapted interpretation of
MMSW Obs.3,  if  it  still  holds  after  our  methodological  concerns  have  been  addressed  (section  3).
Building on reverse causality we also propose another hypothesis for explaining MMSW Obs.2. As we
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demonstrate,  our hypothesis may in fact  complement the MMSW argument of non-blood heirs being
selected for talent (section 4). Moving on, we present evidence that contradicts Obs.1 and Obs.2 during
the last decade of the MMSW observation period. Here, we propose a dynamic perspective that allows for
a consistent interpretation of these contradicting observations. We conclude with a number of suggestions
and reflections (section 6).
2. Methodological concerns
For  evidencing  Obs.2  that  non-blood successors  are  causing  superior  performance  in  listed  Japanese
family firms,  MMSW first  construct  a  sample of  915 succession events,  distinguishing four  types of
successors: blood heirs, non-blood heirs, professional CEOs under family equity control, and outsiders
with the family cashing out. From this original sample they exclude some 231 cases for missing data on
family  trees,  another  124  cases  where  incoming  or  outgoing  “placeholder  professional  CEOs”  are
involved, and yet another 117 cases where successions recur within less than seven years, a time span well
beyond the average tenure of Fortune 500 CEOs, calculated at 4.6 years (Steven Kaplan and Bernadette
Minton 2012). These omissions leave the sample at less than half its original size, namely at 425 cases.
While all  researchers are familiar  with the problem of missing data,  the last  two of these exclusions
require  appropriate  rationales  -  yet  none are  provided.  In  their  “robustness” section (4.4  on p.  850),
MMSW  partially  make  up  for  this,  as  they  show  that  re-including  data  from  the  second  omission
(placeholder  professional  CEOs)  still  yields  “qualitatively  similar  results”.  The  third  omission
(successions recurring within less than seven years), however, lacks both a rationale and a corresponding
robustness check. 
Now if there was a systematic relation between CEO tenure and performance, the implied risk to
the  significance  of  their  results  is  substantial.  For  instance,  let's  assume  that  CEO  performance
systematically declines with tenure. In that case the omitted part of the sample is biased towards cases
with smaller improvement opportunities as businesses are operating closer to their potential. Now, smaller
improvement opportunities imply that a statistically significant difference between successions to sons and
non-blood heirs is less likely to be found.
In  fact,  such  a  systematic  relation  between  CEO  tenure  and  performance  has  earlier  been
conceptualized (Donald Hambrick and Gregory Fukutomi 1991) and positively tested in several instances
(Danny Miller  1991;  Danny Miller  and  Jamal  Shamsie 2001;  Andrew Henderson,  Danny Miller  and
Donald Hambrick 2006; Thorsten Wulf, Katie Roleder, Stephan Stubner and Jutta Mischke 2011). In these
studies, CEO performance is generally found to decline after a few years in office. Thus, the odds of
successors creating a “positive performance event” increase with the tenure of their predecessors. 
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The systematic relation between CEO tenure and performance also gives rise to concern pertaining to the
remaining sample of succession events: MMSW only partially control for the tenures of predecessors, that
we call ‘micro time’, by introducing a dummy variable for parting CEOs aged 65+. While age arguably
represents a covariate of tenure, actual correlation might be low. Direct measures such as predecessor
tenure at succession (or the log of it) would be preferable. 
This control is important because we expect differences in the distribution of ‘predecessor tenure’
for  blood  and  non-blood  heirs.  To substantiate  the  risk  of  such  bias,  it  helps  to  consider  potential
succession  patterns.  Most  commonly,  successions  are  between generations.  In  contrast,  sequential
successions within less than seven years are most likely occurring within a generation. Here, the absence
of a male blood heir is one obvious reason for such intra-generational successions: The parting head hands
over to his younger brother or other family member until a suitable son-in-law can be found, be prepared
for the job, and eventually becomes able to take over. If this pattern is a pertinent explanation for short-
term sequential succession events, the omitted part of the sample will show a corresponding bias toward
non-blood heirs.  In a similar  vein,  an acting head of a family business may be more hesitant  before
handing over control to a non-blood heir, not least because the organizational tenure of sons-in-law is
lower than that of blood sons, who were ‘born into the business’.
Now, if  average  predecessor  tenures  were  indeed  longer  for  non-blood  heirs  in  the  MMSW
sample,  they  would  benefit  from  relatively  greater  improvement  opportunities.  Put  briefly,  without
sufficiently  controlling  for  predecessor  tenure  we  cannot  exclude  the  possibility  that  the  superior
performance of non-blood heirs during the two years after taking office documented in the MMSW study
of  succession  events  (MMSW  Obs.3)  was  merely  due  to  their  entering  firms  that  offered  more
opportunities  for  improvement.  Moreover,  introducing  such  control  might  also  be  helpful  when  re-
including the omitted 117 cases of succession events: While introducing a control variable may absorb
some explanatory power, improved model specification  ceteris  paribus leads to tightening confidence
intervals for parameter estimates.
3. Alternative interpretations
Let’s suppose that MMSW Obs.3 of superior performance of non-blood heirs during the two years after
taking office holds in a robustness check that includes the 117 omitted cases and controls for the tenure of
predecessors.  Could the institution of adult  adoptions then really explain MMSW Obs.1 of superiorly
performing family businesses during 1962 – 2000? According to MMSW, adult adoptions represent an
“exceptionalism” (p. 841) deeply rooted in Japanese tradition and originating in pre-modern Japan. The
principal  purpose  of  this  tradition  has  been  to  preserve  the  patrilineal  household  (the  ie).2 Such
2
The ie has been defined as a social framework designed to continue over generations, under which an inherent 
family homestead, family name, and business are passed on from father to the eldest son (blood or non-blood) 
along a paternal line.
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understanding of the ie then serves to derive “high powered incentives”, namely (Mech. 1) that the least
talented blood sons are replaced by adoptees, (Mech. 2) the “immense reward” of “becoming a business
patriarch’s new ‘number one’ son” on the part of professional managers as potential adoptees (p. 843), and
(Mech. 3) the threat to blood sons of being labeled a “disappointing” son (p. 844) and of being replaced by
a more capable non-blood heir if they were not to try hard enough. Naturally, for Mech. 1 and Mech. 3 to
be effective, there needs to be a blood son to be replaced in the first place.
It is important to note that the concept of ie is a hotly debated matter in the sociology of Japan, with voices
becoming increasingly critical and a number of scholars even labeling the ie system an ‘invented tradition’
(Chizuko Ueno 1996; Roger Goodman 2008). In their article, MMSW provide a most comprehensive
introduction to the system of  ie, largely based on the received  pre-war understanding of the concept.
Whereas MMSW argue in favor of a persisting relevance of the concept in post-war society, we do not
share  their  view.  Significantly,  in  1947,  revisions  to  the  civil  code  abolished  a  number  of  its  core
functions,  notably  the  pre-war  civil  code  procedure  of  a  package  adoption-marriage  (muko  yôshi).
Subsequently, strong economic development and substantial societal change have further weakened its
relevance during the following decades (Haruo Matsubara 1969; Ronald Rindfuss, Minja Kim Choe, Larry
Bumpass and Noriko Tsuya 2004; Joy Hendry 2010).
To complicate things even further, many post-war sources  continue to refer  to  sons-in-law as
muko yôshi (lit. “adopted sons-in-law”), also in cases where sons-in-law have changed their last names for
corporate identity reasons, or even when they simply assume a management role in the business of their
father-in-law. As neither of these cases is necessarily linked to an adoption, risk of confusion abounds.
To corroborate the relevance of the ie system in post-war Japan, MMSW point to a sustained increase in
the total number of adult adoptions from 67'158 in 1965 to 84'175 in 2002 (Table 1, p. 842). Now, these
numbers certainly stand in contrast  to the fading  ie tradition that  we have illustrated.  To resolve this
seeming contradiction,  we propose an alternative route  of explanation for the rising number of  adult
adoptions by illustrating underlying motivations for adult adoption in post-war Japan.
According to Taimie Bryant (1990) the most rapidly growing use of adoptions in contemporary
Japan is for the purpose of reducing inheritance taxes. Incentives to do so are substantial: firstly, even
small land holdings are extremely valuable, and second, the chance of a tax evasion challenge is slim
(ibid). A look at the 2014 inheritance tax table (Appendix) shows that the administratively simple and low-
cost procedure of adopting sons- (and daughters-) in-law still comes with a net tax benefit of JPY 23.5
million in cases where assets of more than JPY 300 million are transferred. This is because Japan does not
tax the inheritance as a whole, but applies the progressive rate separately to each individual share. During
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the MMSW observation period, benefits used to be even higher, as maximum tax rates figured at around
70% (Noriyuki Kikuchi 2005: 60-64).
Based on this alternative understanding of adult adoptions, we expect marriage to precede adoption in the
vast majority of cases. Firstly, the ie system with its narrow purpose of securing the patrilineal household
has been in constant decline since the end of World War II. Secondly, we have found tax avoidance to be
the major motivation for adult adoptions. Thus, adoptions should typically follow a(n) (arranged) marriage
as a rational by-product.
In contrast, starting from their title and their general exposition, MMSW suggest that marriage is
secondary. Unfortunately, MMSW do not specify the marriage-adoption order for the 40 cases involving
marriages  (out  of  the  42  cases  in  their  sample).  They do,  however, refer  to  seven specific  cases  as
examples throughout their text. After checking the order of marriage and adoption events for these cases,
we cannot confirm a single instance of adoption preceding marriage, and find four cases not involving
adoptions at all. Moreover, the three cases involving adoptions took place before the MMSW investigation
period. Specifically we find that:
Cases 1-3: Both Takeo Atsumi, and Rokurô Ishikawa were simply sons-in-law of Morinosuke 
Kajima (of Kajima Construction), but were never adopted (President 2014). 
Morinosuke himself married a Kajima daughter and became adopted simultaneously, 
when the old civil code was still in force in 1930 (Nikkei 1980).
Case 4: Masaharu Hirata (Panasonic) married and also became adopted simultaneously via the 
old system in 1940 (Yasunori Tateishi 1992).
Case 5+6: Osamu Matsuda (Suzuki) married a Suzuki daughter in an arranged marriage in 1958 
and became adopted the same year (WHC 2013). Hirotaka Ono married Osamu’s 
daughter, but was never adopted (Toyo Keizai 2007). 
Case 7: Akira Hotta married Masako Uehara (Taisho Pharmaceuticals) in 1974, changed his 
name to Uehara in 1975, and joined Taisho in 1977 (Nikkei Business 2009).
Now, if this absence of adoptions is representative of the remainder of the MMSW sample3, their research
essentially is about arranged marriages, not about adult adoptions. Accordingly, arranged marriages would
then serve as an extended HR strategy for injecting management talent. As the market for experienced
managerial hires has been very tight in Japan (Mariah Cheng and Arne Kalleberg 1996), this route of
explanation would make considerable sense.
3
Provided that the 4 example events from the investigation period were selected independently, the 90% binomial 
proportion confidence interval for the likelihood of zero (!) cases of adoption for the n=40 cases in MMSW’s 
sample is [0.77; 1.00].
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At the same time, however, eliminating the adoption part of the explanation implies that MMSW’s
“high-powered incentives” (Mech. 1-3) are much less effective. This is because the availability of the
“real option” of marriage is obviously subject to more constraints as opposed to adoptions:
Constraint 1: The HR tool of arranged marriages is only available to patriarchs with daughters.
Constraint 2: Daughters must be willing to accept arranged marriages.
Constraint 3: Becoming a patriarch’s son-in-law is an option only available to non-married 
professional managers.
Constraint 4: Talented professional managers must be willing to accept a marriage partner.
How do these constraints reduce the effectiveness of Mech. 1 to 3?  Constraint 1 reduces the effectiveness
of  all  three  incentive  mechanisms:  Replacing  a  poorly  talented  blood son,  incentivizing  professional
managers, and threatening blood sons through the risk of displacement all depend on having a daughter.
As a matter  of  fact,  40 of the 42 parting patriarchs in the MMSW sample  did have a daughter who
eventually married the successor. Thus, we wonder whether the remaining two non-blood heirs (who did
not marry a daughter) were possibly adopted by patriarchs who did not have a daughter? Or did they have
no offspring at all?
With regard to Constraint 2 (consent of female offspring to arranged marriages), Mech. 1 and 3
may apply if the patriarch has female offspring. In the MMSW sample, Mech. 1 and 3 are not effective in
about half the cases of successions involving non-blood heirs for the simple reason that there were no sons
to be displaced (Footnote 16 on p. 849 in MMSW).
Constraint 3 limits the effect of Mech. 2, because this option is only available to non-married
professional  managers.  From the patriarch's  perspective,  the availability  of  the option of  an arranged
marriage decreases with time (age of daughter as well as age and share of unmarried candidates), which,
in turn, is not the case for adoptions. As MMSW rightly note, “the grooming of a successor likely begins
years  before  the  actual  succession  event”  (p.  848).  As  such  grooming  will  not  go  unnoticed,  the
effectiveness of Mech. 2 and 3 are strongly reduced as the “prize of marriage” becomes unavailable and
the threat of displacement materializes early on.
Finally, Constraint 4 reduces Mech. 2, because not all professional managers might be eager to
marry a daughter of the patriarch.
Let us briefly recapitulate. We strongly doubt whether the incentive mechanisms proposed by MMSW are
causing significant effect. This is because adoptions typically only come about as a rational by-product of
a previously decided marriage, in cases where sons-in-law are still being adopted at all. This leaves us
with arranged marriages to explain the superior performance of sons-in-law in succession events (Obs.3),
if it eventually was to hold after the methodological concerns raised in section 2 have been addressed.
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Replacing  the  adoption  part  of  the  explanation  with  arranged  marriages,  however,  reduces  the
effectiveness of the MMSW “high-powered incentives” (Mech. 1-3), because the availability of the “real
option” of marriage is subject to more constraints than in the case of adoptions.
4. Turning arguments around: converse causality
Section 3 still leaves unexplained MMSW Obs.2 of family firms run by non-blood heirs outperforming
those run by the sons of patriarchs in their long-term sample. Here, we suggest considering the possibility
of converse causality. Whereas MMSW hypothesize that non-blood heirs cause superior performance, it
might actually be worth looking into whether businesses with superior performance are more likely to
attract non-blood successors.
For  understanding  how  such  selection  effect  may  come  about,  it  is  key  to  understand  that
(arranged) marriage represents a family affair involving several parties: patriarch, daughter, blood son, and
prospective son-in-law. Let us look into how their incentive structures depend on firm performance. To
start with, the outsider - or the supply side of such a “transaction” as MMSW refer to it, will obviously
find joining a healthy business a much more attractive opportunity than a turnaround situation. Critics may
argue that the latter should represent an equally attractive bet to aspiring management talent. However, we
agree with MMSW's earlier view that ‘uncertainty avoidance’ is a strong characteristic of Japanese culture
(2011). Moreover, such a bet would not only refer to the make or break of a turnaround, but to the viability
of an entire career. This is because joining a family business as a son-in-law is tantamount to a point of no
return, due to the rigidity of the Japanese labor market in general, and the segment of management talent
in particular (Cheng and Kalleberg 1996).
A similar argument applies to the patriarch: Japanese society has been characterized as a culture of
shame (Takie  Sugiyama Lebra 1983).  Obviously, approaching a  potential  successor  when the firm is
struggling or underperforming is rather shameful, even for the Western business leader. Whereas the latter
still may argue that it was not his fault, for a Japanese individual being actually responsible or not does not
change the feeling of shame. Moreover, while candidates for (arranged) marriages can potentially become
family members, they and their respective families are still outsiders when the selection process starts.
Shame also dictates which information is considered appropriate to be shared with members of an out-
group, and which is to be kept among members of the in-group4. Clearly, information pertaining to a
patriarch’s failure in managing his business belongs to the latter  category. Correspondingly, a parting
patriarch will tend to keep the management of a less successful business inside the family.
Motivations of the daughter require closer inspection. Popular accounts of the struggling family business
frequently portray the image of a loyal daughter agreeing to the sacrifice of an arranged marriage to save
her  father’s legacy. The Confucian value of  filial  piety suggests that  such motivation may indeed be
4 The distinction of in-groups and out-groups corresponds to the concept of uchi and soto in Japanese sociology.
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present.  However, these accounts typically refer to cases where a son-in-law brings assets rather than
talent.  And with arranged marriages representing “transactions”, such asset transactions predominantly
apply to smaller businesses, where limited funds suffice to achieve turnaround. In contrast, the large-scale
listed companies in the MMSW sample will typically struggle with profitability, but not with funding. And
if  they  struggle  with  capital  procurement,  assets  from  a  private  individual  are  unlikely  to  suffice.
Moreover, the  shame aspect in such a context becomes stronger as the daughter (rightly) understands
herself as an item in asset bargaining. In contrast, if the family business is healthy and well performing,
shame is not an issue.  Also, the pool of candidates available for an arranged marriage increases with
profitability and so do real options from the perspective of daughters. In concrete terms, the likelihood of
finding a candidate whose attractiveness matches or exceeds that of an “average” love marriage strongly
increases.  Japan is  no exception to gender-asymmetric spouse-selection:  Japanese women have had a
strong desire to improve (or at least  maintain) their socioeconomic status via marriage,  and therefore
prefer to marry of similar or higher status (Masahiro Yamada 1996).
Finally, blood  sons  may  play  a  pivotal  role  in  solving  the  puzzle.  To understand  how their
incentive structure depends on the profitability of the family business, we first look into the upper half of
the performance distribution. From MMSW data on p. 848 (Table 3) we understand that assets of listed
family businesses average some 120bn yen and annual returns amount to about 5bn yen, or around 40
million USD at 2015 exchange rates. When families hold at least a controlling stake, and with executive
remuneration still at very low levels in Japan (Steven Kaplan 1994; Minoru Nakazato, Mark Ramseyer
and Eric Rasmusen 2009; Georg Blind and Stefania Lottanti von Mandach 2013), the trade-off faced by
blood-sons is,  rather, the following:  earning a  decent  share  of  profits  (likely several  million USD in
healthy businesses) and enjoying a leisurely life vs. working hard in a possibly unattractive job, just to
earn  an  additional  300 thousand USD at  best  (for  reference:  during 1986-1995 average annual  CEO
remuneration was about 33 million Yen, or about 260’000 USD; Takao Kato and Katsuyuki Kubo 2006).
Quite clearly, this is a story about reservation wages, particularly so in large businesses and/or in cases
with high family stakes. In contrast,  in low-performing and/or small businesses the ratio of executive
remuneration to capital income changes entirely. A few hundred thousand USD relative to little or nothing
are  reason  enough  to  strike  out  on  the  successor  path.  Even  more  so  when  considering  that  future
discounted cash flows will predominantly depend on capital income.
Summing up this review of the family incentive structure, we find that patriarchs, daughters, prospective
in-laws, and blood sons alike will be more inclined to consider succession to an outsider if the business
concerned is well-performing. Now, how could this hypothesis be confirmed? First evidence could be
derived from looking into absolute profitability prior to succession: are businesses that are handed over to
sons-in-law significantly more profitable? However, as MMSW rightly note “the grooming of a successor
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likely begins years before the actual succession event” (p. 848). Thus, performance at succession arguably
correlates only weakly with performance at the time of marriage. Comparing absolute performance at
marriage with the industry average would provide a more reliable test statistic. 
MMSW data actually delivers first indications that our argument of reservation wages holds: From Table 3
(p.848) we understand that businesses run by sons-in-law have 45% more assets on average. Also, the
family ownership is some 19% higher. More assets and higher family stakes mean higher capital income,
which directly translates into higher reservation wages.
5. Making sense of contradictory evidence: “The fundamental things might not apply, as time goes
by”
Previous research (Takuji Saito 2008) indicates that MMSW Obs.1 of a generally superior performance of
family businesses over non-family businesses might not apply any more during the last decade of the
MMSW observation period (1962-2000). Examining Tobin’s Q for a sub-period (1990-1998), Saito finds
the performance of family firms owned and managed by blood and non-blood family members (excluding
the founder) to be even  inferior to that of non-family firms. Also, Saito finds that the performance of
family firms managed by sons-in-law is inferior to that of family firms managed by blood sons. Using a
different approach (matched pairs of family and non-family firms) and focusing on return indicators, José
Allouche, Bruno Amann, Jacques Jaussaud and Toshiki Kurashina (2008) still find some evidence for a
general superior performance of Japanese family firms in 1998, but any more in 2003. Moreover, ongoing
research efforts (Zenichi Shishido, Noriyuki Yanagawa, Takuji Saito and Hokuto Dazai 2014) split the
MMSW  observation  period  into  three  sub-periods:  1962-1985,  1986-1992,  and  1993-2000.  Using  a
broader  sample  and  relying  on  a  differences-in-differences  method  they  find  that  non-blood  heirs
outperformed non-family firms in ROA only during the first sub-period.
How could these contradictions possibly be explained? Obviously, any differential such as the
performance difference between family businesses and non-family businesses are difficult to analyze for
the simple reason that change might occur on both sides of the equation. In our view, it is much likely that
significant change actually has occurred on both sides during the 38 years of ‘macro time’ in the MMSW
sample. This is because Japan has not only seen economic extremes from catch-up growth to decades of
stagnation, but has also undergone fundamental structural, institutional and societal change. MMSW aptly
account for the economic dimension of change by using first differences for measuring performance in
their study of succession events. In contrast, they do neither address structural and societal change that
potentially have had an impact on family businesses, nor institutional change pertaining to non-family
businesses. Closer inspection, however, reveals significant change in all these dimensions. 
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Firstly, structural change: During the four decades of the MMSW sample, a great many of Japan’s
family businesses have seen a transition in leadership from founder to subsequent generations with less
and less family businesses being newly listed (as can be inferred from Figure 2 in MMSW 2013) In the
course of this process, family ownership decreases generation by generation (Saito 2008: Table 6 on p.
632) due to capital increases and partial cash-outs. Now, this has important effects on the profitability of
family businesses: As Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud and Kurashina (2008) compellingly document, the level
of ownership is an important determinant of the performance in Japanese family firms. As a matter of fact,
MMSW Table 3 actually provides indicative evidence for such ‘tighter grip’ explanation: For the four
categories  of  firms  run  by  founders,  blood  heirs,  non-blood  heirs  and  salarimen,  ROA and  family
ownership show a correlation of 89%. Taking this evidence together, we understand that structural change
points to family businesses loosing their edge over non-family businesses.
Secondly, societal change explains why sons-in-law may not outperform blood sons any more.
Japan is no exception to the global trend to prefer chosen marriages to arranged ones (Mehrotra, Morck,
Shim  and  Wiwattanakantang  2011),  but  the  pace  and  magnitude  of  this  decline  may  definitely  be
considered  exceptional  (Figure  1,  below).  Obviously,  it  is  becoming  increasingly  difficult  –  or  less
acceptable – to use arranged marriages as an HR strategy. Accordingly, an increasing number of sons-in-
law running a family business are not primarily being selected for management talent anymore. If love is
randomly distributed, the expected talent of sons-in-law is not different from the talent of blood sons
anymore. This would provide a direct explanation for sons-in-law losing their lead over blood sons as
reported by Saito (2008). At the same time, it may also contribute to explaining whether family businesses
are losing their general performance lead: With arranged marriages on the decline, family businesses are
facing the withering of a strategic HR advantage that they once may have had over non-family businesses.
[Figure 1 here]
Thirdly, institutional change, namely legislative reform in the wake of the burst bubble, reportedly has
impacted  on  the  non-family  business  side  of  the  performance  differential,  as  it  helped  to  strengthen
corporate governance in non-family businesses (Takeshi Inagami 2001; Gregory Jackson and Andreas
Moerke 2005; Amon Chizema and Yoshikatsu Shinozawa 2012).  With the performance of non-family
businesses improving relative to that of family businesses, we have another factor indicating that family
businesses might be loosing their lead over non-family businesses in Japan. 
Taking the evidence on these three dimensions of change together, we are inclined to believe, that the
performance  differential  has  become  smaller  during  the  MMSW observation  period.  Admittedly,  the
contradictory  evidence  presented relies  either  on different  methodology, different  indicators,  different
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samples,  or  a  combination  of  these.  Here,  the  MMSW long-term  sample  would  allow  authoritative
evidence on long-term trends of the performance differential. For instance, how would a graph plotting the
performance ratio of family over non-family businesses over time actually look like?
6. Summary and Conclusion
In their article "Adoptive expectations: Rising sons in Japanese family firms" Mehrotra, Morck, Shim and
Wiwattanakantang (2013) explain the superior performance of listed family-run firms in general, and the
superior performance of firms run by non-blood heirs in particular, by referring to two culturally specific
institutions: first and foremost to adult adoptions and, to a lesser degree, to arranged marriages. They
propose  that  adult  adoption  in  family  businesses  leads  to  performance  enhancement  through  three
mechanisms: (Mech.1) non-blood heirs displace the least talented blood heirs in about 10% of businesses;
(Mech.2)  the  prospect  of  a  “non-blood  heir  job”  motivates  professional  managers  in  family-run
businesses; (Mech.3) the threat of being replaced motivates blood heirs.
We have both methodological and conceptual concerns with regard to MMSW's proposition and analysis.
Methodological  concerns pertain to  the exclusion of  117 cases  from the sample of succession events
(reducing  effective  sample  size  by  22%).  As  predecessor  tenure  (or  ‘micro  time’)  is  arguably
systematically linked to performance, their finding of non-blood heirs outperforming blood-heirs becomes
questionable.  Conceptual  concerns  refer  to  the  allegedly  performance-enhancing  function  of  adult
adoptions.
Reviewing the practice of adult adoptions in section 3 we find that adoptions in post-war Japan
are predominantly a by-product of marriages (both arranged and for love) as they serve to cash in on
significant  tax benefits.  Arranged marriages,  however, are subject to considerably more constraints as
compared to adoptions. Accordingly, the MMSW incentive mechanisms will be significantly less effective
than suggested. Adding to these concerns, we see arranged marriages as loosing most of their potential
effect on performance in the course of the MMSW observation period: The share of arranged marriages
has  dramatically  declined  over  the last  decades.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  decline  coincides  with  the
evidence on non-blood heirs losing their lead over blood heirs by the mid-1980s presented in section 5.
Against this background, we doubt whether MMSW Obs.2, namely the superior performance of
the about 10% of family businesses run by sons-in-law, suffices to fully explain MMSW Obs.1 of listed
family firms outperforming non-family businesses in general. Here, the argument of the tighter grip that
family control used to have on business compared to non-family firms represents a more convincing line
of explanation.
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If MMSW Obs.3 of superior performance of non-blood heirs in succession events looses significance after
our  methodological  concerns  are  addressed,  how  could  one  possibly  explain  the  average  superior
performance of businesses led by non-blood heirs (Obs. 2)? To that end we have proposed an alternative
hypothesis in section 4 that centers on the incentive structure of individual family members. Embracing
the possibility of converse causality, it explains how healthy firms are more likely to attract non-blood
successors. In essence, we argue that patriarchs, daughters, prospective in-laws, and blood sons alike are
more likely to consider an arranged marriage if the business concerned is well-performing. 
Our hypothesis also accommodates the decline of arranged marriages in Japan in the incentive
structure of blood daughters: if they marry for love, the managerial talent of their future spouse is not the
decisive  factor.  Accordingly,  evidence  on  gradually  decreasing  performance  differences  between
businesses run by sons vs.  sons-in-law matches our expectation.  From the perspective of investors in
Japanese equities,  news  on marriages  arranged for  talent  should provide valuable  information on the
intrinsic value of the business concerned.
Importantly, our hypothesis is not a strict alternative, but conceptually complements the MMSW
conjecture: at least in the first half of the MMSW observation period, more successful businesses may
have shown a higher likelihood of selecting talented sons-in-law via arranged marriages, causing such
successful businesses to perform even better.
To  judge  whether  our  hypothesis  complements  or  replaces  the  MMSW  conjecture,  addressing  the
methodological concerns raised in section 2 is key. We suggest re-running the analysis of event studies
including the omitted cases and controlling for predecessor tenure. If differences between blood and non-
blood heir performance were still significant, we would then have evidence of successful use of arranged
marriages as an HR strategy. We also suggest looking into change over ‘macro time’: How are the 42 non-
blood successions in the MMSW sample distributed over time? And how has the performance differential
between family and non-family businesses evolved during the 38 years of their observation period? The
former would allow for checking whether arranged marriages as HR strategy have become, as arranged
marriages in general, essentially a story of the past. The latter, in turn, would shed light on the question
whether family businesses are still outperforming non-family businesses in Japan.
Regardless of the outcome of these tests it would be insightful to learn whether MMSW’s data
adds further evidence to our converse causality explanation. So far we have found indicative evidence for
our  argument  pertaining to  the reservation wages of  blood sons:  businesses  run by sons-in-law have
significantly larger assets and founding families hold larger stakes. Both variables directly relate to the
capital income of blood sons. Notably, MMSW data would allow checking whether the businesses handed
over to sons-in-law were significantly more profitable at time of succession. Moreover, MMSW might
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also use their biographical data to test performance at the time of marriage, which would provide the best
possible evidence. 
Finally, there is one more intriguing question that we cannot help wondering about: Were the two
adoptees in MMSW’s sample who did not marry a daughter, possibly adopted by patriarchs that did not
have any offspring? If not, i.e., if those patriarchs actually had some offspring, did the adoptees inherit a
fair share of assets?
To conclude in a general vein, we would like to share our view on how the issues identified here could
possibly arise. To us, it seems that an inadequate consideration of socio-economic change lies at the heart
of this. While the assumption of time invariance is arguably safe in cross-sectional designs, it becomes
potentially  hazardous  in  longitudinal  investigations.  This  is  particularly  the  case  when  the  economic
phenomena under investigation are linked to a value system or the institutional framework, and even more
so when the object of inquiry is subject to rapid transformation processes like in post-war Japan. In such





Amount (JPY million) Tax rate (%) Allowance (JPY million)
< 10 10 0
< 30 15 0,5
< 50 20 2
< 100 30 7
< 300 40 17
> 300 50 47
Source: Translated from National Tax Agency of Japan; https://www.nta.go.jp/taxanswer/sozoku/4155.htm
(Mar 4, 2015)
Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Share of chosen marriages and arranged marriages 1930-2009.
Source: Based on Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS) (2011:30, Table 1).
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